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Abstract
Preferential market access, either in the recent OECD initiatives or in the North-South
FTAs require the use of rules of origin (RoO). Recent studies have questioned the
extent of market access provided by these preferences. Using data on Mexican exports
to the US in 2001, this paper estimates the likely costs of different RoO for final and
intermediate goods, and compares these results with those obtained from a synthetic
index. Econometric results are plausible (they satisfy the revealed preference criterion
that estimated costs of RoO should be less than preference rates when utilization rates
of NAFTA preference are significantly positive), and they indicate that changes in tariff
classification are more costly for final goods than for intermediate goods. For activities
subject to regional value content minima, we carry out illustrative simulations
indicating what tariff preference margin would be necessary to compensate for the
import content minima. Overall, our cost estimates suggest, that at least in the case of
NAFTA, preferential market access was quite small, leading us to speculate that these
conclusions may carry over to other North-South preferential schemes.
JEL classification: F13, F15
Keywords: Rules of Origin, costs, NAFTA.
Résumé
L’ accès préférentiel à un marché, que ce soit dans le cadre d’accords entre pays de
l’OCDE ou de type “Nord-Sud“, nécessite l’utilisation de règles d’origine. De récentes
études ont remis en cause l’importance de l’accès au marché offert par ces systèmes de
préférences. Basé sur des données d’exportations mexicaines destinées au marché des
US en 2001, ce papier estime le coût représenté par les différentes règles d’origine pour
les biens intermédiaires et finals, et compare ces résultats à ceux obtenus à partir d’un
indice synthétique. Les résultats économétriques satisfont le critère de “préférence
révélée”: le coût estimé est inférieur au taux de préférence pour les biens dont le taux
d’utilisation de l’ALENA est significativement positif. Les résultats indiquent qu’un
changement de classification tarifaire est plus coûteux pour un bien final que pour un
bien intermédiaire. Pour les activités sujettes à un critère de “contenu régional
minimum”, des simulations sont proposée afin de mesurer quelle marge de préférence
tarifaire serait nécessaire pour compenser le coût d’un tel critère. De manière générale,
nos estimations de coûts confirment, au moins dans le cadre de l’ALENA, que l’accès
au marché préférentiel a été relativement faible, ce qui doit être également le cas dans
d’autres schémas préférentiels de type “Nord-Sud“.
JEL classification: F13, F15
Mots Clefs: Règle d’origine, coûts, ALENA.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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1. INTRODUCTION
Rules of origin (RoO) are a key ingredient in any preferential trading agreement
(PTA) short of a customs union, as well as in any preferential market access
scheme such as the generalized system of preference (GSP) or the more recent
“everything but arms” (EBA) and African growth opportunity act (AGOA)
initiatives. Low rates of utilization have led many observers to question the
extent of market access, not only because of lower most favored nation (MFN)
tariffs worldwide or because there may be significant learning effects that
contribute to low utilization rates in the early years of implementation, but
mostly because of the presumed cost-raising effects of these seemingly “‘made-
to-measure” RoO. Yet, there is little systematic direct evidence documenting the
cost-raising effects of RoO. This paper provides more systematic evidence for
NAFTA.
Useful anecdotic evidence abounds. For example there is ample documentation
of the stringent requirements that must sometimes be satisfied to meet origin
(i.e. the definition of ‘vessel’ under the EBA (Brenton 2005), the description of
the triple transformation rule widely applied in textiles or the detailed
description of RoO in SADC (Flatters and Kirk 2005). Several contributions have
used gravity trade models with dummy variables or synthetic indices to
capture the effects of RoO. These studies typically conclude that, after
controlling for other factors, trade volumes are indirectly related either toCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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indices of the presence of RoO or of their levels of restrictiveness (see e.g.
Augier et al. 2005; Estevadeordal and Suominen 2005; Cadot et al. 2005).1
Another promising approach, inspired from earlier work on EFTA (Herin, 1986)
has used revealed preference to estimate upper and lower bounds on the cost of
RoO. The assumption here is that for sectors with utilization rates close to 100%,
the utilization rate would give an upper bound on the costs of RoO while for
sectors with close to zero utilization rates, preference rates would provide a
lower bound of the costs associated with RoO. Under the assumption that
transitional adjustment to the administrative requirements of the RoO has taken
place, this non-parametric method is a useful way to obtain bounds on the costs
of RoO when one has data on utilization rates (see e.g. Cadot et al. 2004 and
below).
While useful, these comparisons of utilization rates do not exploit the variance
in the types of RoO used across sectors. Estevadeordal (2000) was the first to
recognize explicitly the importance of different RoO in terms of their potential
cost-raising effects by constructing a synthetic index that explicitly accounted
                    
1 Other contributions have sought to provide more direct estimates. For example, in the context
of The Europe Agreements, Brenton and Manchin (2003) have observed that several East
European partners have preferred to enter the EU market under overseas processing trading
(OPT) arrangements than under the presumably more generous market access provided by the
FTA. More recently, in an assessment of market access provided by the EU under the EBA and
the GSP, Brenton (2005) concludes that the low take-up of preferences under the EBA must at
least partly be due to costs associated with the accompanying RoO.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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for differences in types of RoO.2 The appeal of a synthetic index is potentially of
great practical use since, like suitably constructed effective rates of protection
that provide a summary description of a country’s trade regime, a synthetic
index describing the set of RoO that accompany a preferential agreement could
also provide an overall idea of the restrictiveness of the system of RoO.
As explained below, the observation rule is not confronted with the data (for
example broad categories of sectors (raw materials, intermediates and final
goods) may not be affected in the same way by a given RoO (say a change of
chapter). Nor is its usefulness as a measure of restrictiveness of RoO under
NAFTA systematically analyzed. Within the limits imposed by data availability
(the effects of different types of RoO can only be captured by dummy variables
and firm heterogeneity accounting for observations at the tariff line cannot be
controlled for), this paper provides a more direct estimate of the costs of the
three important categories of RoO under NAFTA: change of tariff classification,
existence or not of a regional value content (RVC) scheme, and the presence or
not of a technical (TECH) requirement. Our estimates also allow us to check the
reasonableness of the assumptions used in building the ri index described
above. Finally for sectors subject to a RVC, we provide illustrative simulations
of the costs-raising effects of these RoO.
                    
2 Estevadeordal built an observation rule that built relied on this assumption: a RoO requiring a
change of chapter heading would be more restrictive than one requiring a change of
classification at the tariff line (HS-8) level, and (other things equal), adding a regional value-
content requirement or a technical requirement would make the RoO more restrictive (and
hence more costly), resulting in an ordinal integer index at the HS-8 level,ri , in the range
[0<ri<7], with the property that larger values of ri would correspond to a more restrictive RoO.
This synthetic index was constructed on the same data for Mexican exports to the US under
NAFTA.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
particular characteristics of the RoO map negotiated under NAFTA that are
relevant for the econometric estimates that follow, and present non-parametric
estimates that can be obtained by the use of a synthetic index. Section 3 presents
a simple model leading to econometric estimates that take into account
differences across broad categories of goods and across types of RoO. Results
from estimating this model are presented in section 4. How these cost estimates
compare with Estevadeordal’s index is discussed in section 5. Section 6 then
carries out illustrative cost calculations in the case where RoO take the form of a
RVC. Conclusions follow in section 7.
2. NAFTA ROO MAP, AND NON-PARAMETRIC COST ESTIMATES
Section 2.1 describes briefly the main RoO in NAFTA, along with utilization
rates in 2001, a year when NAFTA was just about in full force, since the average
preferential rate of 4.1% for Mexican exports was almost equal to the average
US MFN tariff (4.3%). Section 2.2, then turns to non-parametric cost estimates
for 2000 and 2001, based on the ri index.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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2.1 Preferences and Utilization Rates under NAFTA
Table 1 describes the data used in the calculation of the compliance cost
estimates for Mexican exporters of RoO under NAFTA. All data are for 2001,
when NAFTA was in full force, and are defined at the HS-6 level of
aggregation, only for tariff lines with positive exports to the US. This represents
3555 observations3, 99 chapters and 20 sectors. Utilization rates, denoted ui, are
defined as the ratio of USA imports from Mexico under US-NAFTA preferential
tariffs to total USA imports from Mexico (at the 6-digit HS-level). Tariff
preference margins,  i t ~  are also calculated at the product line level and are
defined as:














where world prices are set equal to one by choice of units. Table 1 also reports
in column 5 the average value of Estevadeordal's index (which, as noted above,
takes values in the range 17 ri << ). All data in table 1 are simple (unweighted)
averages at the HS-2 level, i.e. for 20 sectors (with the number of HS-6 level
tariff lines in each sector for 2001).
Table 1 here: Rules of Origin, Preferences and Utilization Rates
                    
3 In view of the econometric estimates that follow, we have eliminated 5 outliers with  100% i t > % ,
3 belonging to Chapter 24 (Tobacco) and 2 to Chapter 12 (Vegetables). These 5 outliers are
classified as “raw materials” according to the WTO, and faced only a Change of Chapter,
without exception, technical requirement or regional value content. The utilization rates for
these five products are 100%.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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In table 1, all data on RoO refers to percentage of tariff lines subject to the
corresponding RoO. Take for example sector 11 (textiles & apparel, henceforth
T&A) with 618 observations at the HS-6 level, and which represents 7.35% of
the total Mexican exports to US in 2001. T&A has an average utilization rate of
79.9% and an average tariff preference margin of 10.4%, with 54% and 41% of
the observations falling under the final and intermediate good respectively.
Within that sector, 80% [19.7%] percent of observations had to satisfy a change
of classification at the chapter [heading] levels, and 42% of the tariff lines had
technical requirements.
Only T&A has an average tariff preference margins above 10%. Note also that
some sectors with a substantial number of observations (i.e. over 100) have
relatively high utilization rates in spite of low preference margins (e.g. stone &
glass, sector 13).
According to stages of processing, raw materials are the least important sector,
since about 30% of observations fall under the intermediate category (which
represents only 4% of the total exports) and the remainder falls under the final
good category (61% of the observations accounting for 87% of Mexican exports
to the US). Finally, in spite of large dispersions within sectors, on average, tariff
preference margins are the same for final and intermediate goods producing
sectors, even though average utilization rates are much higher for the
intermediate goods sectors (74% vs. 54%). If indeed, Mexico has a comparativeCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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advantage in final-goods producing activities, it would appear that RoO which
are only slightly more restrictive according to the ri synthetic index for final
producing activities, have a greater impact on utilization rates than for
intermediate-producing activities.
Turn next to the distribution of types of RoO, recalling that their effects can
only be captured by the use of dummy variables in the statistical analysis
below. About 45% of the tariff lines have to meet a Change of Heading (CH)
with the remainder (50%) having to meet a Change of Chapter (CC). This means
that it would be futile to attempt to capture the effects of both types of changes
in tariff classification since the dummy variables would be almost perfectly
collinear. Along the same lines, note that exceptions (whose effects on costs are
difficult to interpret anyway), denoted E, cover about half of the tariff lines,
being present for 98% of the lines in T&A (sector 11) and 85% in chemicals
(sector 6). Turning to the technical requirements (TECH) which cover only 8.6%
of the lines and 6 sectors, they are concentrated in sector 11. Finally regional
value content (RVC) is prevalent in four sectors, and covers 5% of the
observations.
Finally, we look at the cumulative frequency distribution of the two variables of
interest, utilization rates, ui, and preference margins,  i t ~ . Utilization rates are
evenly distributed around three groups of values: one third of the total sample
with ui equal to zero, one quarter with ui equal of 1 and the remainder in-CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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between. As to preference rates, the sample average preference is 4.11% with
the following quartile distribution: [25%:0%]; [50%:2.58%] and [75%:5.5%].
The distribution of utilization rates and preference margins are quite different
between intermediate and final goods: zero utilization rates (ui=0%) apply for
20% [34%] for intermediate [final] goods. Full utilization rates (ui=100%) apply
for 50% [16%] for intermediate [final] goods. As to the extent of preferential
access, the distribution of  i t ~ , the average for the intermediate goods sample is
around 4.81% and the quartile repartition are: [25%: 0.6%]; [median or 50%:
3.7%] and [75%: 5.5%], whereas for the final goods the average is 4.13% and the
quartile distribution: [25%: 0%]; [median or 50%: 2.5%] and [75%: 7.36%]
2.2. Non-Parametric Estimates
Based on data for 2000 (very close to the data reported in table 1), Anson et al.
(2003) used revealed preference arguments and Estevadeordal’s (2000) synthetic
index,  i r , to estimate the total compliance costs for Mexican exporters to
NAFTA. As a starting point, we carry out the same exercise here with 2001 data
when the average margin of preference was the almost the same (4.11% in 2001
vs. 4.10% in 2000) and the average utilization rate slightly higher (58% vs. 57%).
We also compare these estimates with those for 2000 to see if one can detect any
learning effects through time.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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As a first step, we reproduce for 2001, the non-parametric estimates of
compliance costs of RoO,  i c , expressed as a percentage of unit price, of Anson
et al. carried out for 2000. This involves comparing preference margins and
utilization rates for selected values of the index of restrictiveness,  i r . By
revealed preference, for headings with  100% i u = , the preference margin is an
upper-bound for compliance costs (as  i c  cannot be greater than the benefit
conferred by  i t ~ ). Likewise, for headings with  0% i u = , the preference margin
gives a lower-bound estimate. For the remaining sectors with 0%100% i u << ,
assumptions must be made. Anson et al. (2003) assumed that firms were
indifferent to export to the US under the NAFTA or the MFN regimes
(heterogeneity of firms notwithstanding). Then, an approximation of
compliance costs would be given by the average rate of tariff preference
computed for the remaining sectors, i.e. on the sample 0%100% i u << .
Applying this reasoning, we obtain for 2000, [2001],  6.11% c t == % ,
[ ] 6.16% c t == % .
Anson et al. further break down total compliance costs,  i c , into an
administrative component,  i d , and a distortionary component,  i s :
iii c ds =+ (0.2)
where all variables expressed as a percentage of unit price. To come up with an
estimate of administrative costs, they assume that administrative costs would
be negligible for firms on their participation constraint, (0%100% i u << ),CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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provided that they would also have low values of  i r  i.e. values corresponding
to a change of tariff classification at the heading level, CH, i.e. when  2 £ i r  (not
much paperwork is involved in "proving" a change of heading). Hence,
calculating preference margins for utilization rates close to 100% (say ui=95%)
when  2 £ i r , gives an upper bound of the distortionary component,  i s . These
average preference margins for 2000, [2001] are  [ ] 4.30%4.44% tt == %% . Recalling
that the average total compliance costs for 2000, [2001] are 6.11% c t == % ,
[ ] 6.16% c t == % , we get average administrative cost estimates for d  of
[ ] 6.11%4.30%1.81%6.16%4.44%1.72% dd =-==-= .
Both estimates are close, though interestingly the administrative cost estimate
for 2001 is less than that for 2000 both in absolute terms and in relative terms, as
it falls from 45% to 42% of the total compliance costs (by assumption equal to
the average preference margin). These non-parametric estimates confirm the
hunch that there may be significant learning effects that could explain low
utilization rates in early years of preferential access (see i.e. Brenton 2005 in his
explanation of low take-up under EBA).
3. A SIMPLE MODEL
The above non-parametric cost estimates are averages across sectors, rely
entirely on values taken by the  i r  index, and  potentially gloss over differencesCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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across types of RoO.4  If one is ready to assume that utilization rates provide
some information on the stringency of RoO and to make a few additional
assumptions, one sketch a simple model that improves along these two
dimensions.
Assume first that aggregation from the firm to the tariff line level does not
introduce systematic biases (which we can't check for anyway in the absence of
firm-level data)5. Assume next that the utilization rate of NAFTA for product
line i is a positive function of the difference between the tariff preference rate,
i t% , and (unobserved) total compliance costs,  i c , again expressed as a percentage
of unit price, associated with applying the RoO criteria, i.e.:
' ();(.)0 iii ufcf t =-> % (0.3)
where  i t ~  is defined in (0.1). This assumption is only defensible in the absence of
firm-level information (see appendix) that would recognize that the utilization
rate is a zero-one decision for the firm. So think of (0.3) as a specification for
costs at the aggregated HS-8 level that circumvents the problems associated
with heterogeneous behavior associated with firm heterogeneity (see Ju and
Krishna  2003 and Krishna 2005).
For compliance costs associated with the RoO,  i c , assume a linear relation with
each of the set of relevant RoO, i.e.:
                    
4 Spreads in utilization rates are also assumed to reflect differences in administrative costs
rather than firm heterogeneity. Unfortunately, we have no data to control for firm
heterogeneity, so this source of bias in the model presented here, cannot be controlled for.
5 Observed utilization rates at the HS-6 level are an aggregation of binary firm decisions of
using or not the NAFTA regime (see the description of the firm's decision problem in appendix
A.1).CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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'
iii cRoO dbn =++ (0.4)
Here,  i RoO  is a vector of dummies capturing the RoO described in table 1 and d
captures the administrative cost of RoO. For reasons discussed below, we will
include dummy variables for tariff classification change at the chapter level
(CCi), regional value content (RVCi) , and technical requirement (TECHi) .
Equations (0.3) and (0.4), lead to the following reduced form for estimation:
( ) ( )
'
iiiii uRoO atdbman =--+- % (0.5)
Hence we estimate the following equation:
iiii uRoO latqe =+++ % (0.6)
Estimation of (0.6) yields estimates of ￿ a  and $ q  which can then be used to








Equation (0.7) states that the costs of a RoO will be proportional to the
responsiveness of the utilization rate to the RoO (just like the costs of protection
are an increasing function of the elasticity of import demand) and inversely
proportional to the responsiveness of the utilization rate to the preference
margin.
                    







=+  as for econometric reasons it
is difficult to give an economic interpretation for the regression constant term (notably due to
the econometric  procedure used and to the introduction of dummy variables for section and
stage of production, see in section4).CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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Since the dependent variable (the utilization rate) takes a value of only between
zero or one, the appropriate estimation procedure for the reduced form (0.6) is a
two-limit (or double-censored) Tobit (see e.g. Maddala 1983, chap. 6).7
In this model set-up, it is assumed that preferential rates and RoO are both
exogenous. In reality, RoO are negotiated knowing that the preference margin
will be the MFN tariff (unless it is also under negotiation multilaterally). So
there is a potential multicollinearity between the RoO and  i t%  variables in
equation (0.6). An endogeneity problem would arise if a second equation
explaining RoO as a function of  i t%  and another variable that would also
influence the endogenous variable ui. While this may be the case, in any event
we do not have at our disposal a good variable to instrument the RoO variable.
Morever, instrumenting would be difficult anyway since it would take place
over dummy variables.
In general (and certainly in the case of NAFTA as explained by Estevadeordal
2000) negotiations can be viewed as a “game” played by three parties in which
negotiation is over two instruments: speed of preferential tariffs phase-in and
RoO criteria.  Moreover, in our NAFTA application, we use data for 2001, a year
quite late in the NAFTA process of preferential tariff liberalization (the
preference margin for Mexican imports was equal to the US MFN tariff for 3215
                    
7 The use of the maximum likelihood Tobit estimates of the linear model coefficients is preferred
to the standard OLS estimates using the White correction for heteroskedacity, because the Tobit
model makes expected values of the dependent variable conditional on the probability of
censoring in the sample. Since there is censoring, we will usually report double-censored
estimates, OLS estimates being available upon request.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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tariff lines out of 3555 (at HS-6 level). Finally, the US MFN tariff cannot be
suspected of endogeneity with the NAFTA RoO. Nonetheless, a more ambitious
assessment of RoO would rely on a political-economy approach as in Cadot et
al. (2005).
4. COST ESTIMATES BY TYPE OF ROO AND CATEGORY OF ACTIVITIES
The usefulness of costs estimates obtained from (0.7) depends on the
plausibility of the first stage results for the reduced form estimation, and should
satisfy the revealed-preference criterion used in the non-parametric estimates
above. Estimation is carried out for the whole sample and for broad categories
of goods (intermediates and final goods8) adding sector dummy variables, Dk,
to control for sector-specific heterogeneity:
iiiki k uRoOD latqe =++++ ￿ (0.8)
where  1,,3550;1,,20;,, iii ikRoOCCTECHRVC === KK .9
Expected signs in (0.8) are  123 ˆˆˆ ˆ 0,0,0,0 aqqq ><<< .
Note the bounds on the estimated coefficient values in (0.8). Since all variables
are in the interval [0,1] (we have eliminated the five preference rates above one),
when plugging values obtained from (0.8) into (0.7), one should obtain
reasonable cost estimates provided that measurement errors and biases for the
coefficients in the numerator and denominator are not systematic. One would
                    
8 Adding raw materials does not affect overall results as this category represents only 9% of the
sample. Furthermore, the only RoO component for these products is a CC. However, as
previously explained, we eliminated this part of the sample because all the outliers in terms of
tariff preference margins belonged to this category.
9 For multicollinearity reasons (see section 2), we could not add a dummy for CH and for E in
addition to CCi. Note also that the vector RoOi depends on the category considered, since someCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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also expect different coefficient values for the dummy variables across broad
category of goods: for example a change of chapter should have a greater
negative impact on utilization rates for final than for intermediate goods.
We start with the results for the two broad categories of sectors (intermediates
and final goods), then comment briefly on results for the T&A sector. Table 2
reports the results of the OLS and two-limit Tobit estimates of (0.8). For the
entire sample (3225 observations) all coefficients are strongly significant with
the expected sign: the tariff preference margin influences positively the
utilization rate and the sign of the dummy variables relative to RoO are all
negative, indicating that these requirements reduce the use of the NAFTA
regime.  In this linear specification, in terms of magnitude, the strongest
negative impact on utilization rates comes from the TECH requirement, a
plausible result if one recalls that these requirements are added when it is felt
that a change of tariff heading is “insufficient”.
Turning to the comparison of estimates for final and intermediate goods, note
that TECH is only present for final goods (and applied mostly to the T&A
sector), but RVC is present and significant for both categories. 10
Table 2 here: Determinants of utilization rates and costs of RoO
                                                         
categories of goods do not face certain types of RoO (e.g. intermediates do not face technical
requirements).
10 When the reduced form is estimated for raw materials, the tariff preference margin is positive
and strongly significant (due to some outliers). But CC, the only RoO faced by this category is
not significant. This is not surprising, and conforms with a priori expectations.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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Turn now to the magnitudes of the coefficients on RoO dummies, recalling that
only 5% of the tariff lines have an RVC, and less than 9% a TECH requirement.
Model shortcomings deserve to be mentioned. First, according to (0.3), the
coefficient for  i t ~  in (0.6) represents the impact of the difference between  i t ~  and
ci on the utilization rate. If so, a given increase in ( ii c t - % ) has an impact on ui
about three times as large for intermediates than for final goods. Unfortunately,
in the absence of variation in the values of the RoO variables, the model is
unable to provide clues for this difference in the data. Second, differences in
coefficient values on the RoO variables (which combine the impact of the RoO
variables on the cost ci and the impact of the difference ( ii c t - % ) on ui discussed
above), cannot be interpreted within the model. This said, all coefficient values
have the expected signs and are significant at the 5% level, justifying turning to
the compliance cost estimates obtained by plugging estimates of (0.8) into (0.7).
The contributions to costs of the different RoO are reported in table 4, columns
3 and 4, and will be discussed later.
Table 3 here: Costs and preference rates
For the estimates to be useful, they should meet the revealed preference
criterion used in the non-parametric estimates reported in section 2.2. This
means, that the estimated compliance costs should, on average, be lower
[greater] than the average preference margin for products with an utilizationCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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rate of NAFTA of 100% [0%], whatever the category (total, final or
intermediate). This is indeed the case for all product categories, for utilization
rates of 100% [0%]. As to the products with  i 0%100% u << , the estimated
compliance costs are systematically inferior to the tariff preference margin,
often by non-negligible margins. Given that the preference margins are almost
at the same level for sectors with non-zero utilization rates, it could be that the
absence of variation in the data prevents identifying costs, so that even with
sector dummies, there is too much uncontrolled firm heterogeneity.
Unfortunately, the problem of uncontrolled firm heterogeneity cannot be
alleviated by turning to sector-level estimates, because plausible results could
only be obtained for one sector. Indeed, among the 2-digit sectors with more
than 100 observations and average preference margins above 4% (an estimate of
total compliance costs of 3% of which there are 6 sectors if one omits the misc.
manuf. category), only the largest sector (the T&A sector with 618 observations)
gives significant and plausible results. Since this is an important sector for
Mexico in NAFTA and for developing countries engaged in preferential market
access with Northern countries (e.g. under EBA and AGOA, or under other
FTAs by the EU and US), estimates are reported in the last column of table 3.11
                    
11 The estimation of equation (0.8) for T&A sample (618 observations) by the two-limit Tobit
model, yields the following first stage results:
(0.06)(0.32)(0.06)(0.05
1.153.110.210.37 iiii uCCTECH t =+--
with standard errors in parenthesis and associated compliance cost estimates reported in the
last column of table 3.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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Comparing the estimates for the T&A sector with those for larger categories of
activities, it is clear that both CC and TECH criteria represent larger costs
(respectively 6.7% vs. 3.01% and 11.8% vs. 9.17%) which reflects the fact that
utilization rates are not much higher than average in the T&A sector in spite of
high preferential margins. In interpreting these results, one should be cautious
since the CC and TECH coefficients must capture some of the effects associated
with "exceptions" (98% percent of the lines face an exception in sector 11!). Also
according to the distribution of TECH requirements, these are mostly on
production processes (33% of technical requirements) with the remaining (9%)
on both product and process.
To summarize, among the significant results, the revealed preference criterion
is satisfied and the data classification of the RoO components in terms of
estimated compliance costs is reasonable since CCRVCTECH << . This is
precisely the ranking assumption about restrictiveness used by Estevadeordal
(2000) in setting up his observation rule to construct his synthetic index.
Perhaps more importantly, estimates conform to a priori expectations with
respect to the costs of RoO across broad categories of goods. For instance, the
costs of each component are found to be different across the stages of
production with CC and RVC representing a greater cost for final-goods
producing than for intermediate-goods producing sectors. Since final-goods
producers also faced technical requirements, it is not surprising to find total
compliance costs (on average over all product lines) that are greater for final
goods producing sectors than for intermediate-goods producing sectors (3.2%CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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vs. 2.0%). And given that the tariff preference margin is lower for final goods
than for intermediate (4.3% vs. 4.8%), we can also expect (still in average terms
over all product lines), a lower utilization rate for final goods producing sectors,
than for intermediate goods producing sectors. This is indeed confirmed in
table 2 (utilization rates are 53.9% and 74.3% respectively).
5. EVALUATING ESTEVADEORDAL’S SYNTHETIC INDEX
Can synthetic indices of RoO regimes serve the same summary descriptive roles
as ERPs for trade regimes? We raise this question for Estevadeordal’s index,
constructed from the same data set, and subsequently used by Estevadeordal
and Suominen (2005) to summarize RoO for several FTAs.
Consider first the following calculation. Take US sectors with tariff peaks, i.e. 3
times or more the 2001 average US tariff around 4% and compare the
corresponding average value of  i r  in those sectors with the corresponding
values in the low-tariffs sectors (less than one-third the average tariff). Values
for the index (number of observations in each group in parenthesis) are in
decreasing order of protection:  6.0(257) ri = , and  4.8(1432) ri = . Since tariff
escalation according to the stage of processing is widely observed across all
countries, tariff peaks are concentrated in the final goods sectors. It follows that,
at least according to this index of restrictiveness, under NAFTA, RoO would
protect final-goods producing sectors.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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Are costs similar across types of RoO? Recall from (0.7) that the costs of a given
RoO are assumed to depend how utilization rates react to the RoO and to the
response of utilization rates to preferential rates. Computations of the costs of
each type of RoO (when it applies) according to (0.7) are reported in columns 3
and 4 of table 4. RVC criteria have similar effects for intermediate and final
goods: the imposition of an RVC on a product generates a cost estimated at
4.5% [4.6%] for intermediate [final] goods. As one would expect, a change of
classification at the chapter level (CC) generates a higher cost for final (3.7%)
than for intermediate goods (2.3%).12 Finally, again according to intuition, the
greatest cost for final products results from technical requirements, with an
impact of 11% on total compliance costs.
To evaluate Estevadeordal’s index, we make the necessary assumptions to come
up with a lexicographic ordering suggested by our estimates, then compare it
with his constructed from the observation rule used to construct  i r  index.13
Both rankings are summarized in table 4. On the one hand, Estevadeordal’s
(2000) is built around a finer distinction for the type of change of classification
heading (CH, CS, CI levels), which was impossible to carry out in the
econometric estimates due to quasi-perfect multicollinearity between the CC
and CS dummy variables. On the other hand, for the more restrictive RoO (e.g.
for the combination of RoO with values equal or superior to 5, our costs
estimates allow for a finer distinction (5 values instead of 3) and for a non linear
                    
12 This result still holds when one replaces the CCi dummy by a CHi dummy.
13 We have assumed that for the RoO not included in our econometric indices, they would have
taken a value of 1. This is probably plausible though one may question that CH would take a
value of 1(our justification for this ranking is that cost estimates for CC are low). However, we
use question marks to indicate that the rankings are assumed rather estimated.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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classification. Furthermore, we propose an index different according to the
stage of production, allowing the data to determine if the same RoO represents
a different cost for intermediate-goods producing sectors or for final-goods
producing sectors.
Table 4 here: Comparison of Estevadeordal’s Index and Costs Estimates.
Table 4 shows that the ranking of costs according to the estimates corresponds
to Estevadeordal’s selection of observation rule: costs of CC < costs of RVC <
costs of TECH. However, the two indicators do not generate the same rank
ordering. For instance, since the costs of an RVC is superior to the costs of a CC,
a combination of CH+RVC is more costly than the cost generated by a CC.
Overall, however, for the sample of 3225 observations used in the estimations,
the correlation between the two indices of costs of RoO is 0.66.
Comparisons based on RoO applied only for one preferential market access case
cannot be expected to yield stylized facts, nor a robust assessment of the
usefulness of a synthetic index. On the basis of the above, however, it is fair to
say that the observation rule yields plausible results both in terms of relative
rankings in terms of assumed costs of different types of RoO and in terms of
restrictiveness when confronted with US tariff peaks (on the assumption that,
for political-economy reasons, RoO should be expected to be more restrictive in
sectors with tariff peaks compared with sectors with low rates of protection).
However, if other comparisons point in the same direction, it might beCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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worthwhile to distinguish changes in tariff classification in terms of the broad
categories of sectors they apply to.
6.  VALUE CONTENT RESTRICTIONS
Import content requirements (either in the form of value or quantity) are
frequently used (see Estevadeordal and Suominen 2005, tables 1 and 3): Out of
87 PTAs, 68 require an import content for at least from products; 7 requiring
some form of RVC, and another 67 use some restriction on the value of parts
(VP). When applied, they usually require between 30% and 60% of the value (or
quantity) under constraint to originate in the region.  Among the types of RoO
considered in this paper, import content restrictions hold the greatest promise
for direct quantification of their cost-raising effects. As a first step in this
direction, one can check orders of magnitude suggested by some simple
simulations imposing accepted functional forms and cost-minimizing behavior
in a competitive environment. The simulations below compute the extent of
preferential market access necessary that would leave a cost-minimizing firm
indifferent under different import restrictions.
Suppose then that a Mexican firm, or some other Southern partner firm,
produces under constant returns to scale and perfect competition a final good,
X  which it can sell either in the US (Northern) partner market, or on the ROW
market. The final good is produced with value-added, VA, and intermediates,
Z , i.e.  (,) XFVAZ = . Value-added is produced by capital and labor, i.e.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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(,) VAHKL =  at exogenously determined prices, (,) wr  while intermediates
either come from the US partner, 
A Z , or from the ROW, 
C Z  so that
(,)
AC ZGZZ = , also with exogenously given prices 
, ZA p  and 
, ZC p . Let  (.) F  be
Leontief, and  (.) H  and  (.) G , be CES functions. Profit maximization will imply
that the unit cost function can be written as:
(.) zv
zv caPaP =+ (0.9)
where  , zv aa  are the per-unit input coefficients for intermediates and value-
added respectively, with  , zv PP their corresponding per-unit prices. Under the
CES aggregation functions, the expressions for unit prices are:
,, (,;,,) zzavc
zzz PCESPPgas = (0.10)
where  z g  is a calibration parameter,  z a  is the share parameter and  z s  is the
elasticity of substitution between intermediates of different origin. Likewise, the
unit value-added price is given by:
(,;,,) v
vvv PCESwrgas = (0.11)
where the parameters have the same meaning as in the previous expression.
Perfect competition implies that unit price for the good,  x P equals unit cost, i.e.:
(.) x PC = (0.12)
Finally let there be some market segmentation (or product differentiation by
destination) by assuming that it is costly to reallocate X across markets. Then
unit prices obtained in each market are 
, XA P in the US and 
, XC P in the ROW. LetCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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the ease of substitution across markets be captured by the constant elasticity of
transformation (CET) function, with unit sales given by:
,, (,;,,)
xXAXC
xxx PCETpp gas = (0.13)
where the parameters have the same meaning as in the CES case.
Let, 
A t  be the US ad-valorem tariff, and let the RoO be a RVC in quantity terms.
If subscript zero denotes the optimal per-unit use of the intermediate
originating in the US, and subscript one, the corresponding choices by the firm




leading to the restricted cost function,  (.)
R c . Since 
00 ()()
RR czcz > , one can ask
what rate of preference in the US market is necessary to leave the Mexican firm




XAXA PP t =  so that:
, ,
11 (,)(.)
XA xXCR PCETppc == (0.14)
Table 5 reports the results of illustrative simulations that calculate the margin of
preference that would leave indifferent a Mexican (Southern) exporter facing an
RVC for intermediate purchases.
Table 5 here: Marginal Preferences and Costs under RVCCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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Columns (1) to (4) could be representative of a final-producing goods industry,
with a relatively low value-added ratio, while columns (5) to (8) could be
representative of an intermediate-goods industry with a higher value-added
ratio (lees roundaboutness in the methods of production).
All simulations start from an initial equilibrium situation in which all prices are
unity and in which the share of exports to the US is 50%. For simplicity, we
assume that the two elasticities in the simulations are unity: a Cobb-Douglas for
the substitution for intermediates of different origin and an elasticity of
transformation across export destinations of unity. In this partial equilibrium
set-up, we also assume that the industry is a price-taker in input markets and in
the market for export sales. Finally to ease the interpretation of results, we also
limit the amount that is exported to the initial equilibrium quantities, so that all
firms do is readjust the export mix in response to the change in incentives to sell
in the US market.14
Interpreting the results, note first that the required preferential access is higher
for each RVC constraint in the final (low value-added activity). This is of course
inherent in the model set-up. Next turn to orders of magnitude, given that it is
not clear what the extent of restrictiveness is. For example, Estevadeordal and
Suominen report that, when they are used, RVC percentages are 50% or 60%. So
suppose it is 60%. According to the simulations, if the initial RVC was 40%
                    
14 If one were interested in computing welfare effects, one would incorporate a price responsive
demand curve for total exports, so that binding RoO would then have two effects: a change inCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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[50%], a preference margin of 11% [3%] would be needed to leave the Mexican
exporter indifferent.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Exporters benefiting from preferential market access have to contend with a
vast array of RoO whose cost-raising effects have, so far, escaped quantification.
Using the RoO map negotiated under NAFTA, this paper has attempted to
quantify these costs. Using non-parametric methods based on a widely-used
synthetic index, we have estimated total compliance costs and the
administrative component of total costs. Comparisons between 2000 and 2001
reveal some learning effects as utilization rates increased in spite of
insignificant changes in market access. Calculations also revealed that
administrative costs fell in absolute terms, but also as a percentage of total
compliance costs.
Turning to the econometric estimates carried out for broad categories of goods
(final and intermediates), subject to the limitations imposed by the data in the
form of RoO taking zero-one values), estimates conform to a priori expectations
with respect to the type of RoO and to the costs of a given set of RoO across
broad categories of goods. Other things equal, compliance costs are the least for
a change of tariff classification (here captured by CC), followed by a regional
                                                         
volume and a change in export destination mix. The model would be closed by specifying an
upward-sloping supply curve for primary factors on production in the industry.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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value content (RVC) and by a technical requirement (TECH). Regarding stages
of production, an RVC is more costly for final-goods producing sectors than for
intermediate-goods producing sectors. Estimates also showed that the lower
rate of utilization for final-goods producing sectors under NAFTA (presumable
the sectors in which Mexico had a comparative advantage) could be attributed
to the battery of RoO they faced (after controlling for differences in preferential
access).
Synthetic indices, such as the one proposed by Estevadeordal, which will
continue to be used notably when utilization rates are not available, can give a
summary measure of overall restrictiveness of a given RoO map. We have
therefore compared the lexicographic ordering used by Estevadeordal in his
observation rule with the ordering emerging from our cost estimates. We find
that his ordinal ranking is the same as ours when it comes to individual RoO.
However, they differ when several RoO enter simultaneously, and especially
when it come to the distinction between final-goods producing activities and
intermediate-goods producing activities. This suggests that it might be useful to
build different synthetic indexes for broad categories of activities.
Finally, we have estimated rates of preferential market access that would be
needed to counteract the cost-raising effects for regional value content
requirements when they apply. Under cost-minimization assumptions, and
under acceptable functional forms, it would appear that preference margins of
about 10% would be needed to compensate for a “typical” regional value
content RoO. While much still remains to be done before we get better handleCERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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on the cost-raising effects of RoO, the evidence presented here suggests that
RoO go a long way towards negating the benefits of preferential market access
for the Southern partners that are the presumed beneficiaries of these
preferences.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
31
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APPENDIX : THE MODEL
This appendix develops the firm's decision to indicate the link between the
variables determined at the firm level and the observed data at the HS-6 level,
and justifies the econometric specification.
Firm’s decision. Let index i refer to an HS-6 tariff line observation (this is the
product line for which we have observations on utilization rates and preference
rates). Let there be j=1,…,n Mexican firms export to the US under product
category i. Rank firms so that j=1,…,k export to the US under NAFTA regime
and j=k+1,…,n export under the MFN regime. Let uj =1 [0] represent the firm's
decision to export under NAFTA [MFN], and  j E  firm's j exports to the US.
Finally total unit compliance costs,  j c , associated with RoO include an
administrative component,  j d , and a distortionary cost associated with
implementing the RoO requirement itself,  j s , i.e.  jjj c ds =+. The above
relations suggest that we can write the firm's costs as :
(,) jij cfRoO d = (0.15)
Implicitly, in (0.15) we have assumed that all firms differ in their costs when
they sell product i only because of costs associated with implementing RoO, an
assumption that  will certainly be violated in practice. With this notation, the
















Note that the rate of preference is observed at the HS-6 product level while the
utilization rate decision takes place at the firm level. However, the utilization



































We assume linear specifications for the utilization rate of NAFTA at the product
level:CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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() iiii uc atm =-+ % (0.18)
with  i c , the unit costs associated with RoO at the product level.  i c  is a weighted
average of the firms’ costs  j c . Unfortunately we have no information on the
distribution of these  j c  in each HS-6 level, i. However, we can reasonably
assume that:
'
iii cRoO dbn =++ (0.19)
where b  is a t·1 vector of unknown parameters and RoOi is a is a t·1 vector of
explanatory variables.
Equations (0.18) and (0.19), lead to the reduced form for estimation:
( ) ( )
'
iiiii uRoO atdbman =--+- % (0.20)
Econometric specification
The dependent variable being truncated at both high and low values, the model
becomes:
* ' iiii uRoO latqe =+++ % (0.21)
where 
*
i u is the latent variable,  i e  are residuals that are independently and


















Here, 0 and 1 are the lower and upper limits. The likelihood function for this




















In (0.22),  (.) f  and  (.) F  are, respectively, the density function and distribution
function of the standard normal evaluated at 




1983, chapter 6 for algebraic details).CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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Tables to
Are Different RoO Equally Costly? Evidence from NAFTA
TABLE 1: ROO MAP, PREFERENCES AND UTILIZATION RATES.
Section Obs Export
to US
u ti CC CH CSI E TEC
H
RVC ri Interm Final
      % % Mean Mean % % % % % % Mean % %
1 Live Animals 80 2.3 0.71 30.7 4.1 100 0.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 0.0 6 6.3 23.8
2 Vegetable Prod. 150 4.2 2.17 70.3 3.6 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6 12.7 8.0
3 Fats & Oils 27 0.8 0.02 77.9 5.1 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 0.0 100.0
4 Food. Bev. & tob. 123 3.5 1.75 76.6 7.6 79.7 18.7 1.6 17.1 0.8 0.0 5.6 11.4 86.2
5 Mineral Products 86 2.4 7.17 11.8 0.3 80.2 19.8 0.0 19.8 0.0 0.0 5.6 16.3 4.7
6 Chemicals 430 12.1 1.35 62.3 3.4 75.4 20.0 4.7 84.7 1.2 0.9 5.5 73.5 26.3
7 Plastics & Rubber 175 4.9 1.36 71.7 3.8 11.4 88.0 0.6 26.3 5.7 64.0 4.9 60.6 30.9
8 Leather Goods 52 1.5 0.18 51.3 4.0 61.5 38.5 0.0 42.3 0.0 0.0 5.5 32.7 46.2
9 Wood Products 55 1.5 0.24 37.3 2.1 7.3 92.7 0.0 7.3 0.0 0.0 4.2 43.6 45.5




618 17.4 7.35 79.9 10.4 80.3 19.7 0.0 97.9 41.6 0.0 6.0 40.9 53.9
12 Footwear 47 1.3 0.28 67.6 6.8 19.2 80.9 0.0 72.3 0.0 48.9 4.9 0.0 100.0
13 Stone & Glass 129 3.6 1.15 60.1 3.2 54.3 43.4 2.3 43.4 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.1 89.9
14 Jewellery 35 1.0 0.37 45.5 2.7 60.0 40.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 34.3 40.0
15 Base Metals 430 12.1 3.56 67.9 2.0 42.6 56.1 1.4 45.4 1.2 0.0 4.8 50.5 48.1
16 Mach. & Elec. Eq. 631 17.7 39.52 35.5 1.5 0.0 81.3 18.7 31.9 4.6 1.4 3.8 0.0 100.0
17 Transp. Equip. 85 2.4 20.38 56.4 3.4 2.4 91.8 5.9 14.1 0.0 22.4 4.2 0.0 100.0




8 0.2 0.02 13.4 0.5 62.5 37.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 100.0
20 Misc. Manufact. 127 3.6 8.20 40.4 3.1 82.7 11.8 5.5 0.8 0.0 0.0 5.4 0.0 100.0
Total 3555 100 100 58.0 4.1 50.0 45.1 5.0 47.0 8.6 4.9 5.1 29.5 61.2
Raw 330 9.3 9.4 34.2 1.8 95.2 4.5 0.3 10.3 0.9 0.0 5.9 - -
Interm. 1048 29.5 4.1 74.2 4.8 58.4 39.4 2.2 68.4 0.2 8.7 5.2 - -
Final 2177 61.2 86.6 53.9 4.2 39.1 53.9 7.0 42.2 13.9 3.8 4.9 - -
Notes: total Mexican exports to US under NAFTA = $131 million
All calculations are at the 6-digit level of the HS (so the table presents simple average by sector and category and not the
aggregate indicator. i.e. weighted by the imports values of each line).
ui = utilization rate of the NAFTA regime; ti= tariff preference margin; ri  = the Estevadeordal (2000) index of Rules of
Origin (1<ri<7. a higher value indicating a more restrictive RoO. see text).
CC = Change in Chapter / CH = Change in Heading / CS = Change in Subheading / E = Exception to Change of Tariff
Classification / RVC = Regional Value Content / TECH = Technical Requirement.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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TABLE 2: DETERMINANTS OF UTILIZATION RATES AND TOTAL COSTS OF ROO.
Total Sample Intermediate Goods Final Goods
ui
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
i t% 2.2757** 4.3683** 3.0389** 9.0450** 2.0910** 3.9310**
 (0.41) (0.20) (0.47) (0.54) (0.45) (0.21)
CCi -0.0684** -0.1676** -0.0604** -0.2122** -0.0801** -0.1447**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.02) (0.04)
TECHi -0.2088** -0.4975** - - -0.2288** -0.4391**
(0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09)
RVCi -0.1065** -0.1517** -0.2850** -0.4058* -0.1147** -0.1811*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.12) (-0.24) (0.05) (0.11)
Obs. 3225 3225 1048 1048 2177 2177
R²-adj 0.39 0.38 0.40
Log likelihood -2995.5 -959.8 -2024.8
Notes:
Constant and Dummy variables for section and stage of production are included but not reported in order to save space
OLS: coefficients estimate with Ordinary Least Squared with White correction.
TOBIT: coefficients estimate with the Two-Limit Tobit Model .
Standard deviations in parenthesis.
** and * respectively significant at the 5% and 10% level.
TABLE 3: COSTS AND PREFERENCE RATES.
Total Sample Intermediate
Goods
Final Goods Textiles and Apparel
Obs i t% ˆ
TOBIT
i c Obs i t% ˆ
TOBIT
i c Obs i t% ˆ
TOBIT





1410 5.92% 3.86% 322 5.28% 2.04% 1088 6.10% 4.17% 337 11.82% 13.01%
ui =0% 954 0.38% 1.71% 211 0.76% 1.69% 743 0.27% 1.43% 34 1.87% 6.63%
ui =100% 861 6.32% 3.01% 515 6.17% 1.61% 346 6.55% 3.69% 247 9.71% 5.65%
Notes:





: cost obtained from Two-Limit Tobit Model estimations.CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.12
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index Total Final rank
CI 9 1 N.A. N.A. 1(?)
CS 134 2 N.A. N.A. 1(?)
CS+RVCb/ 2 3 3.84% 4.61% 3
CS+TECH b/ 30 3 11.39% 11.17% 4
CH 1400 4 N.A. N.A. 1(?)
CH+RVC b/ 167 5 3.84% 4.61% 3
CH+TECH b/ 16 5 11.39% 11.17% 4
CH+RVC+ TECH 4 5 15.23% 15.77% 6
CC 1209 6 3.47% 3.68% 2
CC+TECH 254 7 14.86% 14.85% 5
Notes:
a/ Estimates obtained from substituting values obtained in equation (0.7) in equation (0.8)
b/ No distinction between CH and CS in econometric estimates (See text).
N.A. Not applicable (See text).
TABLE 5: RVC AND COMPENSATING PREFERENCE MARGINS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Value Added 30% 30% 30% 30% 60% 60% 60% 60%
Intermediates 70% 70% 70% 70% 40% 40% 40% 40%
Initial Vus/(Vus+Vrow) 20% 30% 40% 50% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Final Vus/(Vus+Vrow) [RoO] 40% 40% 60% 60% 40% 40% 60% 60%
Initial share of exports to US 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Final share of exports to US 55.9% 51.5% 55.3% 51.4% 53.6% 50.9% 53.2% 50.8%
Initial Pus* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
New Pus* 1.13 1.03 1.11 1.03 1.07 1.02 1.07 1.02